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A new line of theoretical and empirical literature emphasizes the pivotal role of fair institutions for growth. We 
present a model, a laboratory experiment, and a simple cross-country regression supporting this view. We model 
an economy with an unequal distribution of property rights, in which individuals can free-ride or cooperate. 
Experimentally we observe a dramatic drop in cooperation (and growth), when inequality is increased by a self-
serving dictator. No such effect is observed when the inequality is increased by a fair procedure. Our regression 
analysis provides basic macroeconomic support for the adverse growth effect of the interaction between the 
degree and the genesis of inequality. We conclude that economies giving equal opportunities to all are not likely 
to suffer retarded growth due to inequality in the way economies with self-serving dictators will. 
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1. Introduction 
The growth of an economy depends – amongst other factors – also on the amount of effort 
that the individuals provide in the production and development processes. When individual 
effort  contributions  create  positive  externalities  for  the  entire  economy  (e.g.  through 
technological spillover, increased tax income, etc.), the added benefit typically is divided up 
according to the distribution of property rights in the economy. Since the provision of effort is 
costly and to some extent non-observable (or not easily verifiable), there is usually scope both 
for  cooperative  behavior  that  enhances  economic  output  and  for  free-riding  behavior  that 
hampers it. If individuals in this framework condition their effort choices on social parameters 
– such as the level or the genesis of income inequality –, the societal configuration may have 
a significant impact on economic growth.  
In fact, Knack and Keefer (1998) find empirical evidence for a negative correlation between 
income  inequality  and  growth.  They  conjecture  that  inequality  harms  growth,  because  it 
impairs  “social  capital,”  i.e.  trust  in  people  and  institutions.
1  Glaeser,  Scheinkman,  and 
Schliefer (2003), however, argue that inequality is not harmful for social capital per se, but 
only in connection with some form of “institutional weakness”. They model a society with a 
weak legal system and show that inequality may substantially reduce the level of investments, 
because investors fear the expropriation of their expected returns by the rich who can bribe 
their way out of the prosecution by the corrupt courts. Hence, the combination of inequality 
and corruption impedes efficient investments, thus leading to low levels of economic growth. 
                                                           
1 Although the cross-section studies provide empirical insights on the macro level, they are bound to leave 
questions concerning the microeconomic foundations unanswered. For a critical assessment of the cross-section 
analyses and an overview of possible channels of interaction between inequality and growth see Aghion, Caroli, 
and García-Peñalosa (1999) as well as Barro (2000).    2
This link between inequality, corruption, and growth finds support in the numerous surveys in 
which  business  people  sound  their  concern  for  corruption  and  preferential  treatment 
(Lambsdorff 2002). 
Without contesting the link suggested by Glaeser et al. (2003), we propose another channel 
for the negative effect of the interaction of injustice and corruption on growth. Our idea is that 
the same level of inequality can affect cooperation behavior in different ways, depending on 
the circumstances under which it has historically emerged. When inequality is perceived as 
resulting from the unfair actions of a few powerful agents, the level of trust in the society 
deteriorates, free-riding increases and the willingness of individuals to cooperate declines. 
But, when inequality is perceived as resulting from a fair procedure (e.g. competition on free 
markets), we conjecture that trust and cooperation are unaffected. We take three steps to find 
evidence for our conjecture: We first introduce and analyze a dynamic game that captures the 
main features of the situation that we have in mind. Next, we report a laboratory experiment 
of  that  game,  comparing  the  degree  of  cooperation  in  the  case  when  inequality  is  a 
consequence of unfair actions to the opposite case. Finally, we run a few simple regression 
analyses of macro data in the search of some basic empirical support for our main hypothesis. 
While close in spirit, there are two key differences between our approach and that of Glaeser 
et al. (2003). On the one hand, Glaeser et al. compare equilibrium behavior in the different 
settings, showing that equilibrium investments are lowest in the case with corruption and 
inequality. In contrast, we compare out-of-equilibrium behavior by measuring the extent of 
cooperation  in  laboratory  experiments  of  the  different  settings.  We  observe  significantly 
lower levels of cooperation when self-serving dictators choose high inequality than otherwise. 
On the other hand, while the poor in the Glaeser et al. model withdraw their investments, 
because they fear that a part of their investment returns may be expropriated, the poor in our   3
model withdraw their effort, because they feel that they have been treated unfairly. Hence, 
while the poor in the Glaeser et al. model act in anticipation of future unfair events, our poor 
react to past unfair events. 
The game we introduce is a dynamic 3-person 2-period game with one “rich” and two “poor” 
individuals. In each period, individuals choose either to cooperate (i.e. increase the total social 
product), to free-ride (i.e. increase the own relative payoff), or to destroy the current period’s 
payoffs  of  all  the  individuals  in  the  economy,  including  the  own.  Free-riding  is  the 
individually  optimal  action,  while  mutual  cooperation  leads  to the efficient outcome. The 
destruction action is clearly dominated, but provides a strong means of punishment.  
There is inequality in the model, because the individual earnings from the social product are 
proportional to individual endowments, i.e. they are greater for the rich than for the poor. 
Hence, being poor in this game means having a smaller share of the property rights to the 
social output than the rich. Just as in Sadrieh and Verbon (2002), the degree of inequality is 
varied.  The  important  new  feature  of  this  study  is  that,  in  one  treatment,  the  degree  of 
inequality is chosen by the rich individual (the dictator) before the interaction starts. Hence, 
in  our  dictator  treatment  we  sometimes  observe  a  high  inequality  economy  DicHi (Gini-
coefficient .6) and sometime a low inequality economy DicLo (Gini-coefficient .1), depending 
on the choice made by the rich individual. Our experimental control treatment consists of two 
settings where the inequality is fixed by nature: in NatHi the high inequality economy and in 
NatLo the low inequality economy are implemented at random by the experimenter. 
Our main hypothesis is that the cooperation by the poor is on a much lower level when the 
high inequality setting is chosen by the rich (the dictator) than when it is implemented by the 
experimenters (by nature). In contrast, when the rich deliberately choose the low inequality 
setting, we expect that the poor engage in even more cooperation than in a low inequality   4
setting fixed by nature. Hence, we expect the reciprocal behavior of the poor in the dictator 
treatment to lead to a clear negative effect of inequality choice on growth, while in the nature 
treatment we expect to replicate the neutrality finding of Sadrieh and Verbon (2002).  
The experimental results are in line with our three hypotheses: When implemented by nature 
(i.e  a  random  draw),  inequality  has  no  effect  whatsoever  on  the  level  of  cooperation.  In 
contrast, when implemented by the choice of the rich dictator, choosing high (low) inequality 
leads to a significantly lower (higher) level of cooperation by the poor than in the nature 
treatment. Hence, we find a strong and significantly negative effect of inequality on growth, 
but only when inequality results from deliberate actions of the rich dictator.
2  
Our experimental results suggest that the willingness to initiate and sustain cooperation in a 
society crucially depends on the historic process that created the distribution of wealth. This 
means that simply correlating inequality to growth may miss out on an important aspect of the 
issue, namely the genesis of inequality. We expect to find a negative correlation between 
inequality and growth only when inequality has emerged due to discriminating and corrupt 
actions of the rich and powerful, but not when it is the result of differences in capabilities and 
preferences in an otherwise just society. Thus, inequality that arises in free market economies 
where  the  political  systems  are  perceived  as  fair  has  a  different  effect  on  the  economic 
development than inequality that arises in corrupt and politically biased societies. We provide 
basic empirical support for this hypothesis in a simple regression analysis in section 5. Before 
that, we introduce our model in section 2 and report on the experiment in sections 3 and 4. 
                                                           
2 Our results seem related to the literature on reciprocal responses that asserts that an agent’s response not only 
depends on the consequences, but also on the intentions of other agents’ actions. Rabin (1993) introduces a first 
formal  model  that  is  enhanced  by  Dufwenberg  and  Kirchsteiger  (1998).  Blount  (1995)  and  Falk,  Fehr  and 
Fischbacher (2000) find more reciprocation to human than to the randomized first movers. Fehr and Rockenbach 
(2003) show that the level of positive reciprocity is higher when punishment is possible, but deliberately not 
chosen, than when punishment is not possible in the first place.   5
2. The Model  
We assume there are n individuals i = 1,...,n with capital endowments,  0 > i w . All capital is 
productive, and individuals can generate a return on the total capital available by exerting 
effort  i s ( . ,..., 1 n i = ).  Effort  can  be  interpreted  as  the  time  or  attention  an  individual 
contributes  to  the  production  process.  All  individual’s  efforts  are  perfect  substitutes  in 
generating returns on capital, i.e. the marginal productivity of effort is the same for every 
individual. The efforts  i s that are exerted by the individuals ( . ,..., 1 n i = ) are aggregated to 
form  total  labor  input  in  production.  Total  output  i i f w s s w S S = ) , (   is  distributed  in 
proportion to the capital endowments (i.e. the endowments are ownership rights to society’s 
return on efforts).  The individual’s effort involves a cost (e.g. a decrease in utility due to the 
loss of leisure) that is borne by the individual himself. As in Aghion et al. (1999) the cost 
incurred by individual i is proportional to total capital accumulated in the economy and the 
squared individual efforts,  2 / ) , (
2
i i c w s s w S = .
3 The payoff of individual  i at the end of a 
period is equal to his share  i i w w S /  of the total product minus effort cost: 
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    (1) 
Notice that the individual effort choices have the character of voluntary contributions to a 
public good: All members of the society gain when an individual exerts productive effort, but 
the cost of exerting the effort is borne by the individual alone. Moreover, if no individual 
contributes  to  the  generation  of  a  return  on  investment  (i.e.  n j ,..., 1 , 0 j = = s )  everyone’s 
                                                           
3  We  introduce  this  cost  function  because  it  generates  a  convenient  description  of  Nash  behavior.  The 
interpretation for this specification, apart from the familiar U-shaped form, is that as the economy becomes more 
prosperous the utility loss of providing a certain amount of effort increases.     6
gross  and  net  return  will  be  zero.  It  can  readily  be  calculated  that  for  any  vector  of 








j i / w w s               (2) 
Notice that, according to equation (2), it will always be optimal to contribute towards the 
public  good,  i.e.  0 > i s ,  irrespective  of  the  contributions  by  the  others.  Thus,  the  Nash 
equilibrium will not be at a corner of the action space. In our experiment, subjects had to 
choose between playing Nash or playing cooperatively. As is well-known, the literature has 
not arrived at a unique objective function for cooperation in games like this. This left it up to 
us to choose a cooperative structure, so we picked a structure that was simple to implement 
experimentally and led to substantial payoff differences compared to Nash. The following 
specification,  in  which  a  constant  amount  of  effort  (.25)  is  added to every player’s Nash 
equilibrium effort, satisfied these criteria: 
25 . 0 + = i
C
i s s               (3) 
Next period’s endowment is the discounted sum of this period’s endowment and payoff that is 




i w p r w + =
+ wherer  is a discount factor. (For the experiment, we 
set  3 / 2 = r ). In the next period, with the updated wealth levels, the individual again must 
decide whether to play Nash, as defined by (2), or to play cooperatively, as defined by (3). 
The payoff of the new period is again determined by (1), but now for the updated values of 
the individual endowments. The total payoff of each individual is obtained by adding up all 
period payoffs. The total payoff, thus, indicates the absolute growth an individual has realized 
on  his  initial  endowment.  The  individual  rate  of  growth  can  then  be  obtained  by  simply 
dividing the total payoff by the initial endowment.   7
After each period of the game, every individual has the option to destroy the entire current 
production of the economy. If destruction is chosen by any single individual, the payoffs of 
all individuals for the current round are zero and the endowments retain the original previous 
period size. In particular, if in all periods at least one member chooses the destruction option, 
perfect income equality is established, because the total payoff of every individual is zero.
4  
3. Experimental Conditions and Procedures  
The  dynamic  public  goods  game  described  in  the  previous  section  was  played  in  four 
experimental conditions. In every condition, an observation consisted of 3 players (that are 
called “an economy” in the following) with a total endowment of 300. In the low inequality 
setting, the rich had an endowment of 120, while the endowment of the poor was 90. In the 
high inequality setting, the endowments were 220 for the rich and 40 for the poor. In each 
session  of  the  nature  treatment,  the  experimenter  determined  one  of  the  two  possible 
distributions of endowments and informed the subjects before the game started. In the dictator 
treatment, the experimenter informed the subjects that the rich individual will choose one of 
the two possible distributions before the game starts. After this choice was made the subjects 
were informed on the chosen distribution of endowments and the game started. This method 
of  determining  the  initial  endowments  was  the  only  difference  between  the  treatments. 
Combining the method of distribution selection (nature vs. dictator) with the two possible 
outcomes  (low  inequality  vs.  high  inequality)  gives  us  the  four  experimental  conditions 
NatLo, NatHi, DicLo, DicHi that are summarized in table 1. 
                                                           
4 A number of experimental studies have shown that subjects are willing to incur a substantial loss, if necessary, 
in order to avoid a large income inequality. E.g. in ultimatum games (Güth 1995; Roth 1995), responders reject 
up to 40% of the benefits of trade, just to avoid an unfair 40%-60% division of the surplus. The phenomenon 
that subjects are willing to pay a high price to reduce income inequality is not only observed in the ultimatum 
game, but also in other games (see e.g. Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner 2000; Bosman and van Winden 2002).   8
In all conditions, a two-period version of the dynamic public goods game was played. In each 
period, players first chose their effort levels. They could choose to act cooperatively or to 
free-ride (i.e. play Nash equilibrium strategy). After all effort choices were made, subjects 
received  feedback  on  all  choices  and  payoff  consequences  in  their  economy.  Then,  each 
subject was given the opportunity to destroy the period’s payoffs of all individuals in the 
economy (including their own payoff). In the second period of the game, the same decisions 
had to be taken. After the second period had been completed, subjects received their final 
payoffs.  All  actions  were  presented  to  the  subjects  in  neutral  terms:  the  free-riding  and 
cooperative actions were called “A” and “B,” respectively, and the payoff destruction action 
was called “reset.” 
Table 1 – Experimental Conditions 











NatLo  by nature  Low (.10)  (120, 90, 90)  21  7 
NatHi  by nature  High (.60)  (220, 40, 40)  24  8 
DicLo  by  dictator  Low (.10)  (120, 90, 90)  24  8 
DicHi  by  dictator  High (.60)  (220, 40, 40)  24  8 
. 
All sessions took place at the CentERlab, at Tilburg University. The subjects were student 
volunteers that were hired via public recruitment on campus. Most of them were first year 
students in economics, business, and social sciences. Upon entering the laboratory, subjects 
were asked to draw a card from a covered deck. The randomly drawn card determined the 
table number at which they were seated. The matching of the tables into economies and the 
roles of the players had been randomly determined before the experiment started. 
The game was extensively explained to the subjects. After subjects had read the instructions 
(reproduced in Appendix A), they were asked to answer two guided practice questions that   9
tested their understanding of the game. All subjects successfully solved the control questions. 
In total, 93 subjects (forming 31 economies) participated in the experiment. The distribution 
of economies over the treatments is given in Table 1. Incidentally, exactly one half of the rich 
subjects in the dictator treatment opted for the low inequality and one half opted for the high 
inequality distribution. Each subject participated only in one session. All sessions were held 
in May, June, and September 2002.  
The experiment was run with paper and pencil. Students were seated in cubicles and were 
asked not to communicate. The payoff information was presented to subjects in tables (see 
Appendix B). The tables were organized so that each subject saw the own payoffs in the first 
column and the payoffs of the other players in the other two columns. Using the tables, the 
subjects could quickly “look forward” through both periods of the dynamic game.  
Subjects did not know the identity of the other subjects in their economy, but they were fully 
informed of the contribution history in their economy. No explicit time limit was given to 
subjects.  Nevertheless,  the  duration  of  no  session  exceeded  the  two  hours  that  had  been 
announced on the posters. The average duration of a session was about one hour and twenty 
minutes. At the end of the experiment, subjects received a monetary payment consisting of a 
show-up  fee  of  3  Euros  plus  the  experimental  payoff  that  was  converted  at  a  rate of  20 
Eurocents per point. Payments to the subjects, including show-up fee, ranged from 4 to 44.6 
Euros, with an average of 10.10 Euros (1 Euro exchanged at the rate of about $1 at the time). 
4. Experimental Evidence 
Table  2  contains  information  on  the  individual  choices  regarding  cooperative  effort  and 
destruction in both periods of the game. In the first part of the table, the cooperative effort 
choices of rich and poor individuals are given for the first period.    10
We first check whether the neutrality result found by Sadrieh and Verbon (2002) is replicated, 
i.e. whether the inclination to cooperate by rich and poor individuals is neutral to the degree 
of inequality in the nature treatment. According to Table 2, in the nature treatment, 3 out of 7 
low inequality economies show cooperative effort choices by the rich, while cooperation is 
exhibited  for  the  high  inequality  economies  in  5  out  of  8  cases.  This  small  difference 
obviously  is  not  statistically  significant.  Likewise,  the  difference  in  cooperative  efforts 
provided by the poor (5 out of 14 in NatLo and 7 out of 16 in NatHi economies) is not 
significantly different. This gives support to the finding that inequality – when it emerges 
from  a fair, but random process – is neutral and does not have any growth-enhancing or 
growth-decreasing effects. This leads to our first result: 
Result 1:  Inequality given by nature (a fair, but random process) does not have an effect on 
the level of cooperation by rich and poor individuals 
Let us now turn to the dictator treatment. Remember that in that case the rich individual 
determines which distribution should be put in place before effort choices are made. Notice 
from table 2 that the rich are not much affected by their own choice of inequality: Only 2 of 
the 8 rich, who choose low inequality as dictators, also choose the cooperative action. This 
ratio is not significantly different from the ratio of one out of the 8 rich dictators, who chooses 
high inequality and cooperation. The behavior of the poor, however, is significantly affected 
by the distribution that the dictator chooses: While 10 of 16 poor provide cooperatively high 
effort, when low inequality has been chosen, only 2 of 16 cooperate, when high inequality has 
been chosen. This difference in the number of cooperative plays is highly significant (a £ .01; 
two-tailed). Thus, if the rich dictator chooses low inequality, the poor reciprocate by putting 
more effort into generating returns on the capital stock. Hence, if the poor and powerless in an 
economy know that those who are in power have actively reduced the inequality, then they   11
provide  more  effort  to  the  benefit  of  the  entire  economy.  On  the  other  hand,  dictators 
choosing high inequality seem to signal a self-serving attitude that induces a large majority of 
the poor to behave non-cooperatively. This is laid down in our second result: 
Result 2:  In the dictator treatment the poor will provide more cooperative effort under low 
inequality than under high inequality. 




1. First period cooperative effort choices 
  Rich    Poor 
Treatments  Dictator  Nature  Fisher 
b)    Dictator  Nature  Fisher 
Low inequality  2   (0.25)  3   (0.43)  .33    10   (0.63)  5   (0.36)  .10 
High inequality  1   (0.13)  5   (0.63)  .06    2   (0.13)  7   (0.44)  .05 
Fisher  .40  .30      .00  .27   
2. First period destruction choices 
Low inequality  0   (0.00)  0   (0.00)      0   (0.00)  0   (0.00)   
High inequality  0   (0.00)  1   (0.13)      1   (0.06)  1   (0.06)   
3. Second period cooperative effort choices 
Low inequality  2   (0.25)  1   (0.14)  .43    3   (0.19)  4   (0.29)  .28 
High inequality  1   (0.13)  3   (0.38)  .25    1   (0.06)  6   (0.38)  .04 
Fisher  .40  .29      .25  .27   
4. Second period destruction choices 
Low inequality  1   (0.13)  0   (0.00)      1   (0.06)  1   (0.07)   
High inequality  0   (0.00)  0   (0.00)      2   (0.13)  1   (0.06)   
5. Pay-off points 
Low inequality  73.57  77.50      55.06  60.50   
High inequality  43.13  86.13      21.94  27.50   
a) The entries indicate the frequency of cooperative effort choices (sections 1 and 3) or destruction choices 
(sections 2 and 4). The relative frequencies are given in parentheses. Section 5 indicates average total payoff.  
b)  “Fisher”  stands  for  the  Fisher’s  exact  probability  test  for  two  independent  samples.  The  entries  in  the 
“Fisher” columns (rows) indicate the two-tailed error probability for rejecting the Null hypothesis (H0 = no 
treatment differences). A value at or below .10  is considered to indicate a significant treatment difference.  
 
A key issue in this paper is the question whether the way inequality arises has an effect on 
individual behavior. We can analyze this issue by comparing the effort choices in the dictator   12
settings to the effort choices in the corresponding nature settings. Comparing across columns 
in Table 2 shows that under low inequality, the behavior of the rich is the same, no matter 
whether the distribution was randomly selected or was an explicit own choice: 3 of 7 rich in 
NatLo and 2 of 8 rich in DicLo provide cooperative efforts. In the case of high inequality, 
however, the rich are significantly (a £ .10; two-tailed) more cooperative in NatHi, where the 
income  distribution  is  set  by  nature  (5  out  of  8),  than  in  DicHi,  where  the  chose  high 
inequality distribution themselves (1 out of 8). But, of course, there may be a selection bias 
here, because the rich, who choose high inequality, can be expected to be less cooperative. 
For the poor the picture is even clearer. Under high inequality, the poor are significantly less 
cooperative (a £ .05; two-tailed), if the distribution has come about by willful choice of the 
rich dictator than if the distribution has been determined by nature: 2 of 16 poor cooperate in 
DicHi, while 7 of 16 do so in NatHi. Under low inequality we find the reverse: the poor are 
significantly (a £ .10; two-tailed) more cooperative when the rich choose the low inequality 
distribution than when it is put in place by nature (10 of 16 poor cooperate in DicLo, but only 
5 of 14 poor cooperate in NatLo). This leads to our third result:  
Result 3a: The poor are more cooperative when low inequality has been set by the dictator 
instead of by nature.  
Result 3b: The poor are less cooperative when high inequality has been set by the dictator 
instead of by nature. 
Notice that result 3b survives in the second period, but result 3a does not. As can be seen in 
the third part of Table 2, the case of poor in the DicLo treatment is the only case in which the 
general level of cooperation actually changes dramatically in the second period. In all other 
cases,  we  observe  about  the  same  level  of  cooperation  in  the  second  period  as  we  had 
observed  in  the  first  period.  Thus,  we  have  no  indication  of  a  general  “end  effect”  (i.e.   13
increased  free-riding  at  the  end  of  a  finitely  repeated  game).  The  negative  effect  of  a 
deliberate choice of high inequality on the poor players’ willingness to cooperate is so strong 
that result 3b persists in the second period at the same significance level as in the first: the 
poor  in  DicHi  economies  exert  significantly  lower  cooperative  effort  than  in  NatHi 
economies, both in the first and in the second period. In contrast, the positive effect of a 
deliberate choice of low inequality on the poor players’ propensity to be cooperative is not 
strong enough to influence behavior in both periods: the frequency of cooperation by poor in 
DicLo is significantly greater than in NatLo in the first period, but drops to the same level in 
the second period.   
Result 3 makes clear that poor individuals reciprocate the “kind” act of a dictator choosing 
low inequality by exerting high productive efforts, but punish the “unkind” act of choosing 
high inequality by exerting low productive efforts. Note that the “punishment” by providing 
uncooperative efforts is not costly to the punisher, because it is the best response strategy. The 
destruction option that all individuals in the economy have at the end of each period provides 
a quite different – and very costly – punishment possibility. If any individual chooses this 
option the current period payoffs will be lost for all individuals. From the second part of 
Table 2 it is clear that this option is used rarely. Only 3 of the 93 individuals use this option in 
the first period and they are dispersed over all treatments.
5  In the fourth part of Table 2, we 
see that one rich and 5 poor individuals choose to destroy the returns of the second period. 
Obviously, destruction in this stage has no “educational” effect anymore, but it may be used 
                                                           
5 Looking at the individual choices in the cases in which destruction took place in the first period, we see the 
following. The case where the rich individual chose destruction, the first period choice was BAA (where B 
indicates cooperation, A indicates Nash effort, and the choice of the rich is given first). Apparently the rich was 
disappointed that both poor chose A. In another case, one of the poor chose destruction, even though the dictator, 
who had chosen high inequality, showed “remorse” by choosing B in the first period. In the third case, the 
cooperating poor chose destruction apparently to punish the other poor, who had chosen to free-ride in a NatHi 
session, in which the rich had also chosen to cooperate.   14
as punishment, because it affects the final payoffs.
6 Apparently, almost all rich individuals 
choose to safeguard the payoff that they have generated, while some of the poor individuals 
care  less  for  their  final  payoffs  and  remain  willing  to  punish  others.
7  Finally,  it  seems 
interesting that in three of the five DicHi economies, in which one of the subjects chooses the 
cooperative effort level, a destruction of the returns occurs. Apparently, when the dictator opts 
for high inequality, cooperation frequently is followed by destruction, because cooperation by 
one player tends to stay an isolated act.  
Figure 1 shows the observed growth rate of every economy in every treatment normalized to 
equilibrium  growth.  To  derive  the  normalized  growth  rates,  we  subtract  the  equilibrium 
payoff of each individual from the total payoff obtained in the experiment and express the 
result as a percentage of their endowment (see the fifth part of Table 2). The resulting number 
indicates to what degree the individuals have been able to realize a higher than equilibrium 
growth. Figure 1 shows the average normalized growth rates of all economies.  
In the dictator treatments positive growth rates are obtained in 2 high inequality economies 
and 5 low inequality economies. In 3 high inequality economies sizable negative growth rates 
are observed, while this is the case in only 1 low inequality economy. As a result of these 
differences the average growth rate over all economies is clearly positive in the low inequality 
setting, while it is negative in the high inequality setting. In the nature treatments positive 
growth rates are obtained in 6 low inequality economies and 5 high inequality economies; in 3 
high inequality economies negative growth rates are observed, while this is the case in 1 low 
                                                           
6 It might be noticed here that in no economy the destruction option was chosen twice. 
7 The one rich individual that chose to destroy was a very cooperative one. He opted for the equal distribution 
first  and  then  chose  the  cooperative  B  twice.  After  he  saw  that  neither  of  the  two  poor  subjects  chose  to 
cooperate in the second period, he decided to destroy their (and his own) returns.   15
inequality economy. Apparently, in the nature treatment the effect of inequality on growth is 
inconclusive, although average growth is somewhat higher in the low inequality setting.  
Figure 1 – Total growth for each economy and each treatment* 
*) Each bar represents an independent observation of growth per economy, sorted in a descending order. 
Comparing the nature and dictator treatments, it appears that the differences in growth for 
given low inequality are only minor: in the nature treatment 6 out of 7 economies realize 
positive growth rates, while this holds for 5 out of 8 economies in the dictator treatment. As a 
result, the average growth rate is slightly higher in the nature treatment (0.16 versus 0.13). In 
the  high  inequality  setting,  however,  the  differences  are  clearly  discernible:  5  out  of  8 
economies in the nature treatment realize positive growth rates while in the dictator treatment 
2 out of 8 economies realize positive but small growth rates, leading to a sizable difference in 
the average growth rate.  This leads to: 
Result 4:  Low  inequality  leads  to  higher  growth  than  high  inequality  in  the  dictator 





















































































































































5. Empirical evidence on the growth-inequality relationship 
Our  experimental  results  suggest  that  when  free-riding  behavior  can  harm  economic 
development, the adverse effect of inequality on growth depends on the interaction of the 
degree and the genesis of inequality. In this section, we present very simple cross-section 
regression analyses that provide some rather basic evidence for the external validity of our 
experimental finding. Checking our main hypothesis requires a measure of the genesis of 
inequality to be included in a standard regression of inequality on growth. In principle, the 
required parameter should represent an evaluation of the “fairness” of the procedure (or the 
institutions) that historically led to the observed degree of inequality. If the procedure was 
fair, then we expect growth to be unaffected by inequality. If it was unfair, we expect to 
observe a strong negative correlation between inequality and growth.  
Obviously, there is no simple way to assess the genesis of inequality across countries. The 
closest  (accessible)  proxy  that  we  can  think  of  is  corruption.  It  seems  straightforward  to 
assume that people perceive the genesis of inequality as especially unfair in societies in which 
a high degree of corruption governs economic activities. If corruption is a good proxy, then 
we should observe that the adverse effect of inequality on growth mainly runs through the 
interaction of inequality and corruption. This is exactly what we find. 
The effect of corruption on growth was first measured by Mauro (1995), who finds an adverse 
effect of corruption. Ehrlich and Lui (1999), in a somewhat more elaborate model, also find 
significant  adverse  effects  of  corruption  variables  on  growth.  Neither  paper,  however, 
includes an inequality measure in the analysis and neither examines the interaction between 
inequality and corruption that is necessary for testing our hypothesis.    17
The analysis that comes closest to ours is provided by Glaeser et al. (2003), who regress GDP 
growth on inequality and on a binary variable indicating whether a country has a “strong legal 
system” or not. They find that: “Inequality is bad for growth, but only in countries with poor 
rule of law.” (p. 215). This result is in line with our experimental results and with the cross-
country evidence we provide below, which shows that inequality is bad for growth, but much 
more so when corruption is high. In this sense, our analysis complements the findings of 
Glaeser et al. (2003) and extends these to a richer measure of institutional fairness. 
The corruption index that we use is constructed by Transparency International.
8 The index 
describes the level of perceived corruption in each country using of a collection of corruption 
and political risk indexes for the 1990’s. We transfer the originally negative score into the 
range from 0 (low corruption) to 10 (high corruption). As a measure of inequality we use the 
Gini  coefficients  reported  by  Deininger  and  Squire  (1996).  The  measure  ranges  from  0 
(complete equality) to 100 (complete inequality). Our dependent variable is the GDP growth 
per  capita  over  the  period  1991-2001  and  is  taken  from  the  World  Bank’s  “World 
Development Indicators”.
9 We use an average over a relatively long period (ten years) to 
capture the long-run characteristics of the economies and to avoid cyclic short term effects as 
far as possible. We were able to construct a full data set for 49 countries.  
Before reporting the results, we must note, that we are fully aware of the of econometric 
difficulties that plague such an analysis (e.g. endogeneity biases, omitted-variable biases, and 
measurement errors). We therefore see the evidence provided here only as indicative for the 
empirical prevalence of the conjectured effect. In this sense, our analysis is along the same 
                                                           
8 For details see the website: http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/cpi2002.en.html 
9 For details see the website: www.worldbank.orghttp://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html    18
lines as the one provided by Glaeser et al. (2003, p. 214), who caution that their cross-country 
regression evidence should be interpreted as being “only suggestive.” 
Table 3 displays our regression results. The simple regression in column (1) reproduces the 
well-known negative effect of inequality on growth. The second regression in column (2) 
adds corruption as an explanatory variable. Both coefficients have the expected negative signs 
and the explanatory power increases considerably compared to the simple regression in (1). 
But, while a highly significant coefficient is estimated for corruption, the effect of inequality 
is no longer significant. The regression in column (3) includes an interaction term between 
inequality  and  corruption.  Once  again,  the  explanatory  power  of  the  regression  increases. 
Now,  the  coefficient  for  the  interaction  term  takes  on  a  negative  and  highly  significant 
coefficient. The coefficient for inequality remains negative and is significant again, but at 
only about one-third of the value in (1). The coefficient for corruption has a positive sign, but 
is far from being significant, which indicates that the effect of corruption on growth only runs 
through the interaction with inequality. Finally, in the regression (4), we drop the corruption 
parameter,  obtaining  a  significant  intercept,  a  significant  (but  positive)  coefficient  for 
inequality, and a significant coefficient for the interaction term. This final regression supports 
the result that the interaction between inequality and corruption is more decisive for growth 
than either of the two parameters separately. But, the regression also indicates that in absence 
of corruption, inequality actually has a growth enhancing effect. This is in line with theories 
that predict investment activity to be positively correlated to inequality, due to the higher 
marginal propensity of the rich to invest
10. With all due caution, we note that this result may 
provide  the  missing  link  between  the  positive  investment  and  the  negative  social  capital 
approaches discussed in the field (see Aghion et al. 1999; Barro 2000).    19
Table 3. Inequality, Corruption, and Growth  
Dependent variable: Ten year average GDP growth per capita (1991-2001) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Constant  3.065 (0.642)  0.607 (0.856)  3.622 (1.380)  2.007 (0.581) 
Gini  – 0.031 (0.016)  – 0.006 (0.015)  – 0.088 (0.034)  0.047 (0.021) 
Corruption    – 0.295 (0.077)  0.300 (0.233)   
Corruption*Gini/100      – 1.740 (0.648)  – 0.948 (0.203) 
Adjusted R
2  0.058  0.270  0.357  0.348 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Based on the regression (4) in table 3, we estimate growth for the lowest level (corruption 
index = 0) and the highest level (corruption index = 10) of corruption combined with the low 
(Gini = 20) and the high (Gini = 60) income inequality used in our experiment. The result of 
this estimation is displayed in table 4. Comparing across lines it becomes evident that high 
inequality can be growth enhancing without corruption, but it is detrimental for the economic 
development when it goes hand in hand with high levels of corruption. 
Table 4. Estimated Effect of Inequality and Corruption on Growth 
per capita GDP growth  low corruption (index = 0)  high corruption (index = 10) 
low inequality (Gini = 10)  2.48  1.53 
high inequality (Gini = 60)  4.83  – 0.86 
 
6. Conclusions  
Both the empirical and the theoretical research on the relationship between inequality and 
growth have come to ambiguous results, sometimes finding a positive, sometimes a negative, 
and sometimes varying correlations (Aghion et al. 1999; Barro 2000). It seems that more 
theoretical and experimental work on the behavioral micro-foundations will be necessary to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
10 Our experiment was not designed to check for this effect, because investment decision are not modeled.   20
untangle the complicated mechanisms that govern the relationship between inequality and 
growth. In a first paper, we put Knack and Keefer’s (1997) conjecture that inequality destroys 
“social capital” to a direct experimental test, but found no evidence whatsoever in support of 
it: the observed level of cooperation was independent of the implemented degree of inequality 
(Sadrieh and Verbon 2002). Given the clear result, it seems evident that something more than 
inequality by itself is needed to observe the collapse of societal cooperation.  
The hypothesis we started this paper with is that the degree of cooperation not only depends 
on the degree of inequality, but also on its genesis. To be able to examine this hypothesis, we 
first introduce a model that allows for out-of-equilibrium, but efficient, mutual cooperation in 
an unequal income setting. We then conduct laboratory experiments using this model in two 
variants. In the nature variant, the degree of inequality – either high or low inequality – is 
selected by the experimenter at random. In the dictator variant, the degree of inequality is 
selected by the only “rich” individual in the 3-person economy. The results of the experiment 
are as conjectured: Inequality is only detrimental to cooperation and, thus, to growth, when it 
is deliberately chosen by the rich dictator. As in the previous experiment, inequality has no 
effect when it is brought on by a random draw, i.e. by a “fair procedure”. 
In an attempt to give this micro-foundations result some macroeconomic substance, we run 
simple regressions of cross-country data on per-capita growth, inequality (Gini coefficients), 
and corruption (“corruption perception index” of Transparency International). With all due 
caveats in interpreting such simple regression models, the effect seems to be strong enough to 
allow confidence in its support for our hypothesis. The adverse effect on growth is entirely 
captured by the interaction term of inequality and corruption, leaving inequality with a small 
positive coefficient and corruption without a significant coefficient.    21
Our result strongly supports the spreading view that the real output effects of inequality are 
linked  to  the  institutions  governing  the  economy  (see  Glaeser  et  al.  2003).  The  special 
contribution of our paper is to show a new channel through which this interaction may be 
effective. The channel we suggest and examine is that of voluntary cooperation in a social 
dilemma  type  situation.  The  idea  is  that  a  substantial  part  of  the  effort  that  is  put  into 
production by the labor force is non-verifiable and, hence, will dependent on the individual’s 
trust and emotional attachment to the society. Clearly, these may both be severely damaged 
by inequality that results from the actions of a self-serving dictator, but not by inequality 
emerging from a fair competition. 
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 Appendix A – Instructions 
This is an experiment on economic decision-making within groups over 2 periods. These instructions explain the 
workings of the experiment and if you follow them carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of money, 
which will be paid to you in cash. You are expected to make decisions on your own without consulting other 
participants. So, please, do not communicate with the other participants. Otherwise, we might have to stop the 
experiment.  
How does this experiment work? Each group consists of 3 participants, so you are in a group with 2 others in 
the room but you will not be able to identify your group members. The group members will be indicated by a 
color: Red, Blue, and Green. For the purposes of this instruction we will just talk of “your group members”. At 
the beginning of period 1, each group member has some amount of start capital. At least one of your group 
members will have a start capital that differs from yours.  The start capital that you get can be relatively low, or 
it can be relatively high. Which of the two will hold for you will be decided by the Red player, who in both cases 
will have the highest start capital in your group. Of course, if you happen to be the Red player you will decide on 
your own and the others’ start capital.  
Whatever your start capital may be you can enlarge your start capital over two periods by making a decision 
each period. These decisions determine the return that you are earning on your capital. The development of your 
capital does not only depend on your own decisions, but also on the decisions of the other members of your 
group. Based on these decisions, at the end of the 2
nd period you will have accumulated a certain amount of final 
capital. From this final capital the start capital will be subtracted resulting in the payoffs that determine your 
earnings out of this experiment.  
In each period, each group member chooses simultaneously one of two options: A or B. As will become clear 
from the payoff sheets to be discussed in a moment, if all group members choose B, the capital of all group 
members will grow more than if all choose A. However, if you choose B alone, while the other group members 
choose A, your capital will grow less while the others’ capital will grow more, than if you had chosen A. 
Consider the 2 payoff sheets on your desk. These sheets contain important information on your payoff during the 
experiment. However, if we start playing the experiment, only 1 of the two payoff sheets are relevant for your 
decisions. Which payoff tables that will be, depends on the Red player’s decision. If the Red player chooses the 
start capital of 220 for him- or herself and 40 for Blue and Green, payoff sheet 1 is relevant to all of you. But if 
the Red player chooses the start capital of 120 for him- or herself and 90 for Blue and Green, payoff sheets 2 is 
relevant to all of you. 
Let us assume that a payoff sheet 1 is relevant. But, the same reasoning applies if payoff sheet 2 is relevant. For 
that case, just change in the following, payoff sheet 1 into payoff sheet 2. When you decide on A or B in the 1
st 
period, you do not know your group members’ 1
st period choices. However, if you choose A in the 1
st period, 
then, whatever the choices of your group members, payoff sheet 1 LEFT is from then on relevant for you. On the 
other hand, if you choose B in the 1
st period, payoff sheet 1 RIGHT is relevant. So, a choice between A or B is a 
choice between payoff sheets 1 LEFT and 1 RIGHT. The structure of payoff sheets 1 LEFT and 1 RIGHT is   24
identical. It suffices, therefore, to consider one of those payoff sheets only. Let us look at payoff sheet 1 LEFT, 
where your 1
st period decision is A. Omit for a moment the table at the center of the page, saying, “If 1st period 
choice was Reset”.   
Payoff sheet 1 LEFT  shows 4 payoff tables. These tables give the possible payoff you and your group members 
will generate, depending on you and your group members’ 2
nd period choices. The letters in the rows of those 
tables show the decisions of your group (including yourself) in period 2 and the numbers show the final payoff 
for you and your group members corresponding to these decisions. The first of those numbers is always your 
final payoff, while the next two numbers are those of your group members. Which of these four tables is relevant 
for you will depend on the 1
st period choice of your group members. If they both choose A, then the first table 
saying “If 1
st period choice was (A, A, A)” is relevant, but if the first other group member chooses A and the 
other one chooses B the second table saying “If 1
st period choice was (A, A, B)” is relevant. The other two tables 
will be relevant, if the first other group member chooses B, and the other chooses A, or when they both choose 
B, respectively. In payoff sheet 1 RIGHT you will notice that the first letter in the headings of the payoff tables 
is not A, but B, corresponding with a 1
st period decision of yours of B instead of A. 
Once all 1st period decisions on A or B are made, the experimenter will collect all the decision sheets, and return 
them with the decisions of your group members on A or B included. Then you will know exactly which payoff 
table on the left-hand side of the payoff sheet is relevant for you. Notice that in your payoff table the payoffs of 
your group members are shown as well. To help you the experimenter will mark this table with a cross.  
After all group members know their payoff table, each group member is given a reset option. If one group 
member chooses to reset, then the capital of every group member after the 1
st period will be reset to the start 
capital. What this implies for the payoff is shown by the “Reset” table at CENTER of Payoff sheet 1. You or one 
of your group members might prefer the Reset option over and above the relevant table at the left-hand side of 
the Payoff sheet.   
The experimenter will communicate to all group members whether there has been a reset, or not. If not, then the 
table at the left-hand side that was marked with a cross will be the table that is decisive for your final payoff. 
But, if there has been a reset, table CENTER on the page is decisive. 
After the decision whether or not to reset, the 2
nd period starts. In the 2
nd period again each group member 
chooses simultaneously from one of two options: A or B. Like in the 1
st period, when you decide on A or B, you 
do not know your group members’ 2
nd period choices. If you choose A, then the first four rows in your relevant 
table shows you the possible payoffs for you and your group members. If you choose B, then the last four rows 
in your relevant table show you the possible payoffs for you and your group members. Which of those four rows 
is decisive for your final payoff depends on your group members. 
After everyone has decided on A or B, the experimenter will collect the decision sheets and return them with the 
decision of your group members. Then you will know exactly which row in your payoff table is relevant for you. 
To help you the experimenter will mark this row with a cross. Again, after all group members have decided for 
A or B in the 2
nd period, each group member is given a reset option. If one group member chooses to reset, then 
the capital of every group member after the 2
nd period will be reset to the start capital of the 2
nd period. What this 
implies for the final payoff is shown by the bottom row of the table saying, “Reset”. You or one of your group   25
members might prefer the Reset option over and above the relevant rows in your payoff table. Notice that if you 
are already in the Reset table, a reset choice in your group will lead to zero final payoffs for all group members. 
This is due to a choice for reset in the 1
st and the 2
nd period, which implies that the final capital for you and your 
group  members  equals  the  start  capital.  As  a  result    the  payoff  for  any  of  your  group  members,  including 
yourself, equals the show-up fee. 
The experimenter will collect all decisions on the reset option and thereafter communicate to all group members 
whether there has been a reset, or not. If not, then the row in the table that was marked with a cross will be 
decisive for your final payoff. But, if there has been a reset, the bottom row of the table is decisive for your final 
payoff. 
The final payoff will be exchanged into earnings at the rate of 20 cent per point. Your total earnings from the 
experiment are paid to you at the end of the experiment in cash. Additionally, each of you will receive a fixed 
payment of 3 Euro for participation in the experiment. 
Summarizing. First the Red player decides on the distribution of capital. That choice determines whether the 
Payoff sheet 1 or Payoff sheet 2 is used. Your own 1
st period choice determines whether sheet 1 LEFT or sheet 1 
RIGHT (or, sheet 2 LEFT or sheet 2 RIGHT) is decisive for your and the others’ payoff. The 1
st period choices 
of your group members fix the table on the left/right-hand side of the relevant payoff sheet. However, if you or 
one of your group members chooses to reset in the 1
st period, the “Reset” table on the center of the sheet is 
decisive.  The 2
nd period choices of you and your group members determine which row in the chosen table is 
going to be decisive for the payoffs. However, if any one in your group (including yourself) has opted for a reset 
in the 2
nd period, the bottom row in the chosen table sets the payoffs for all group members. 
Practice rounds. Before running the actual experiments, we give you the opportunity to have some practice. For 
these practice rounds you can use the payoff sheets on your desk, which are also used for the actual experiment. 
Moreover, you can use the practice sheets, which are handed out to you now. You will not be paid for the results 
of these rounds, these rounds are only meant to let you become acquainted with the structure of the experiment. 
First, we play two practice rounds together for payoff sheets 1. After that, we play two practice rounds together 
for payoff sheets 2.   
During these rounds I announce what you and your group members are hypothetically doing. This information is 
indicated on your group-practice sheets by A1.1, etc. You indicate on your guided-practice sheets which payoff 
sheets, tables, or payoffs are relevant behind the questions Q1.1. etc.    26
Appendix B – Payoff Sheets 
Payoff sheet of the rich in the high inequality treatment (Gini = .6).  
The other payoff sheets contained exactly the same information, but the columns of the tables were sorted in a 
way that had each subject’s own payoff in the first column.  
 
PAYOFF SHEET LEFT  
START CAPITAL (220, 40, 40)  
Payoff tables, if your 1
st  choice was A  
 
PAYOFF SHEET CENTER  
START CAPITAL (220, 40, 40)  
If 1
st period choice was Reset  
 
PAYOFF SHEET RIGHT  
START CAPITAL (220, 40, 40)  
Payoff tables, if your 1
st choice was B  
                                             
If 1
st period choice was (A, A, A)                    If 1
st period choice was (B, A, A) 
Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue                   Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue 
A  A  A    44  26  26                    A  A  A    39  34  34 
A  A  B    84  35  19                    A  A  B    78  44  27 
A  B  A    84  19  35                    A  B  A    78  27  44 
A  B  B    123  28  28                    A  B  B    117  37  37 
B  A  A    36  35  35                    B  A  A    32  44  44 
B  A  B    76  43  28                    B  A  B    71  54  37 
B  B  A    76  28  43                    B  B  A    71  37  54 
B  B  B    116  36  36                    B  B  B    110  47  47 
  Reset      20  12  12                      Reset      13  18  18 
                                             
If 1
st period choice was (A, A, B)    If 1
st period choice was Reset    If 1
st period choice was (B, A, B) 
Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue 
A  A  A    81  35  19    A  A  A    20  12  12    A  A  A    77  43  27 
A  A  B    127  44  11    A  A  B    56  18  5    A  A  B    122  54  19 
A  B  A    127  27  26    A  B  A    56  5  18    A  B  A    122  35  36 
A  B  B    173  36  18    A  B  B    93  12  12    A  B  B    167  46  28 
B  A  A    73  44  26    B  A  A    13  18  18    B  A  A    69  54  36 
B  A  B    119  54  18    B  A  B    50  25  12    B  A  B    114  65  28 
B  B  A    119  36  34    B  B  A    50  12  25    B  B  A    114  46  44 
B  B  B    165  46  26    B  B  B    87  19  19    B  B  B    159  56  36 
  Reset      56  18  5      Reset      0  0  0      Reset      50  25  12 
                                             
If 1
st period choice was (A, B, A)                    If 1
st period choice was (B, B, A) 
Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue                   Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue 
A  A  A    81  19  35                    A  A  A    77  27  43 
A  A  B    127  26  27                    A  A  B    122  36  35 
A  B  A    127  11  44                    A  B  A    122  19  54 
A  B  B    173  18  36                    A  B  B    167  28  46 
B  A  A    73  26  44                    B  A  A    69  36  54 
B  A  B    119  34  36                    B  A  B    114  44  46 
B  B  A    119  18  54                    B  B  A    114  28  65 
B  B  B    165  26  46                    B  B  B    159  36  56 
  Reset      56  5  18                      Reset      50  12  25 
                                             
If 1
st period choice was (A, B, B)                    If 1
st period choice was (B, B, B) 
Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue     Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue 
A  A  A    119  27  27      A  A  A    115  35  35 
A  A  B    171  36  18      A  A  B    166  45  27 
A  B  A    171  18  36      A  B  A    166  27  45 
A  B  B    223  27  27      A  B  B    217  36  36 
B  A  A    110  36  36      B  A  A    106  45  45 
B  A  B    162  44  27      B  A  B    157  55  36 
B  B  A    162  27  44      B  B  A    157  36  55 
B  B  B    215  36  36      B  B  B    208  46  46 
  Reset      93  12  12   
The tables on the left and right -hand 
side are decisive for your payoff if 
there has been no reset in the 1
st period. 
If there has been a reset, the CENTER 
table determines your payoff. The last 
row of any table will be the payoff if 
there has been a reset in the 2
nd period. 
Letters in the rows are 2
nd-period 
choices of you and your group 
members Green and Blue; Numbers are 
the corresponding payoffs for you, 
Green and Blue.      Reset      87  19  19   27
Payoff sheet of the rich in the low inequality treatment (Gini = .1).  
The other payoff sheets contained exactly the same information, but the columns of the tables were sorted in a 
way that had each subject’s own payoff in the first column.  
 
PAYOFF SHEET LEFT  
START CAPITAL (120, 90, 90)  
Payoff tables, if your 1
st  choice was A  
 
PAYOFF SHEET CENTER  
START CAPITAL (120, 90, 90)  
If 1
st period choice was Reset  
 
PAYOFF SHEET RIGHT  
START CAPITAL (120, 90, 90)  
Payoff tables, if your 1
st choice was B  
                                             
If 1
st period choice was (A, A, A)                    If 1
st period choice was (B, A, A) 
Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue                   Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue 
A  A  A    53  47  47                    A  A  A    47  64  64 
A  A  B    77  65  39                    A  A  B    70  85  56 
A  B  A    77  39  65                    A  B  A    70  56  85 
A  B  B    101  58  58                    A  B  B    93  77  77 
B  A  A    45  65  65                    B  A  A    39  85  85 
B  A  B    69  84  58                    B  A  B    62  106  77 
B  B  A    69  58  84                    B  B  A    62  77  106 
B  B  B    93  76  76                    B  B  B    85  98  98 
  Reset      24  21  21                      Reset      18  36  36 
                                             
If 1
st period choice was (A, A, B)    If 1
st period choice was Reset    If 1
st period choice was (B, A, B) 
Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue 
A  A  A    76  65  40    A  A  A    24  21  21    A  A  A    71  82  58 
A  A  B    103  86  32    A  A  B    44  36  15    A  A  B    97  106  50 
A  B  A    103  56  58    A  B  A    44  15  36    A  B  A    97  73  78 
A  B  B    131  77  50    A  B  B    64  30  30    A  B  B    123  97  69 
B  A  A    68  86  58    B  A  A    18  36  36    B  A  A    62  106  78 
B  A  B    95  107  50    B  A  B    38  51  30    B  A  B    88  129  69 
B  B  A    95  77  75    B  B  A    38  30  51    B  B  A    88  97  98 
B  B  B    122  98  67    B  B  B    58  45  45    B  B  B    114  120  89 
  Reset      44  36  15      Reset      0  0  0      Reset      38  51  30 
                                             
If 1
st period choice was (A, B, A)                    If 1
st period choice was (B, B, A) 
Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue                   Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue 
A  A  A    76  40  65                    A  A  A    71  58  82 
A  A  B    103  58  56                    A  A  B    97  78  73 
A  B  A    103  32  86                    A  B  A    97  50  106 
A  B  B    131  50  77                    A  B  B    123  69  97 
B  A  A    68  58  86                    B  A  A    62  78  106 
B  A  B    95  75  77                    B  A  B    88  98  97 
B  B  A    95  50  107                    B  B  A    88  69  129 
B  B  B    122  67  98                    B  B  B    114  89  120 
  Reset      44  15  36                      Reset      38  30  51 
                                             
If 1
st period choice was (A, B, B)                    If 1
st period choice was (B, B, B) 
Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue     Red  Green  Blue   Red  Green  Blue 
A  A  A    99  58  58      A  A  A    93  76  76 
A  A  B    129  78  50      A  A  B    123  99  67 
A  B  A    129  50  78      A  B  A    123  67  99 
A  B  B    160  70  70      A  B  B    153  89  89 
B  A  A    90  78  78      B  A  A    84  99  99 
B  A  B    121  98  70      B  A  B    114  121  89 
B  B  A    121  70  98      B  B  A    114  89  121 
B  B  B    151  89  89      B  B  B    143  112  112 
  Reset      64  30  30   
The tables on the left and right -hand 
side are decisive for your payoff if 
there has been no reset in the 1
st period. 
If there has been a reset, the CENTER 
table determines your payoff. The last 
row of any table will be the payoff if 
there has been a reset in the 2
nd period. 
Letters in the rows are 2
nd-period 
choices of you and your group 
members Green and Blue; Numbers are 
the corresponding payoffs for you, 
Green and Blue.      Reset      58  45  45 
 
 